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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Contracts-Statutory Modification of Consideration
Twenty states have enacted statutes modifying as a whole the
common-law requirement of consideration in connection with written
contracts. This list is exclusive of those which, like North Carolina,'
have adopted legislation changing particular judicial applications of
the rules of consideration. Nor does it include statutory changes in
the common-law effects of seals, some of which make the presence of
the seal presumptive evidence of consideration. 2 The statutes in
IN. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §895, commented upon in (1929) 8 N. C.
L. Ray. 71 and in (1930) 9 N. C. L. REv. 30; and N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie,
1927) §990.
2 For a list of such states, see 1 WrLLisToN, CONTRACTS (1919) §218.
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-question are of three types: (1) those which declare "a written in:strument is presumptive evidence of consideration," "is evidence of
consideration," or "shall import a consideration" ;3 (2) those which
.give unsealed written promises the effect which sealed contracts had
.at common law, i. e., enforceability without consideration;4 and (3)
-the Uniform Written Obligations Act,5 which recites that "a written
release or promise hereafter made and signed by the person releasing
,or promising shall not be invalid or unenforceable for lack of consideration, if the writing also contains an additional express state-,ment that the signer intends to be legally bound."
This third type of statute is of recent origin and has been enacted
in but two states. It has not yet become involved in litigation, but
:has aroused much discussion. 6 The statutes of type (2) are reminiscent of the view propounded by Lord Mansfield in Phillans v. Van
Mierop,7 decided in 1765, that a promise was binding merely because
it was in writing, without any consideration or seal. The first type
,of statute is based upon the probability8 that consideration is present
' "Presumptive Evidence," CAl, Civ. CODE (Deering, 1927) §1614; IDAHO
(1919) §5663; MONT. REv. CODE (1921) §7512; OxTA. Cm. STAT.

•Com. STAT.

(1921) §5027;
(1919) §848.

NORTH

DAY. CODM.
STAT. (1913)

"Evidence of consideration,"

§5881;

SOUTH DAK. REV. CODE

ALA. CIv. CODE (1923) §7662; TENN. ANN.
(Shannon, 1917) §3214; Ky. STAT. (Carroll, 1922) §§471, 472.
"Imports a consideration," IowA CODE (1927) §9440; KAN. REv. STAT. ANN.
(1923) c. 16, §107; LA. Civ. CODE (1920) §1894; Mo. REv. STAT. (1919) §2160;
'TEx. STAT. (1920) Art. 7093.
""Every contract in writing shall import a consideration in the same manner
.and as fully as sealed instruments have heretofore done." Aiz. CIv. CODE
(1913) §5564; Miss. ANN. CODE (Hemingway, 1927) §9005; N. M. AiN. STAT.
(1915) §2181; WYom. Com. STAT. ANN. (1920) §4598; see McLeod v. State,
69 Miss. 221, 13 So. 268 (1891); Bank of Artesia v. Home Ins. Co., 16 N. M.
66, 113 Pac. 815 (1911).
"Approved by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in August 1925; (1925) HANDBOOK NATIONAL CONFERENCE UNIFORM STATE LAWS, 214. Enacted in Pennsylvania in 1927; 1927 P. L. 985;
PA. STAT. (Supp. 1928) §16016a, Enacted in Utah in 1929.
'Attacked in (1928) 14 Am. BAR Asso. J. 348; (1926) 21 ILL. L. RIv. 185;
defended (1928) 14 Am. BAR Asso. J. 554; (1927) 76 U. PA. L. REv. 580.
73 Burr. 1663 (1765) ; The House of Lords in Rann v. Hughes, 7 T. R. 350,
n. (a) (1778) rejected Pillans v. Van Mierop, and said, "if contracts be merely
written and not specialties they are parol and a consideration must be proved."
North Carolina, as do all states which do not have statutes modifying consideration for written instruments, follows Rann v. Hughes. In Green v. Thornton, 49 N. C. 230 (1856), Battle, J. said, "putting the contract in writing, if
not under seal, will not help it."
'It is generally agreed that a presumption may be based on probability
(when A and B are repeatedly found together, when A appears, B will be
presumed) ; or may be created as a method of fairly apportioning the production of evidence (when facts are most familiar to one party, a presumption
'with regard to those facts and operating against the party will induce him to
CODE

198

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

in most written contracts. A study of the procedural usefulness of
that sort of legislation, as indicated by the cases decided thereunder,
is the object of this note.
To avail himself of the presumption created by the statute the
party relying on the contract must establish that the writing is of the
opponent's making. This accomplished, the presumption is operative,
and if the opponent would avoid its effect, he must show there is no
consideration. The party relying on the contract will allege an agreement in writing, 9 or if the nature of the contract is such that a
writing is required, he need allege only the making of a contract. 1 .
It is unnecessary to allege a consideration. 1 ' This is a consequence
of the statute, for the common-law' 2 and code' 3 rule is that the
presence of consideration must be alleged. If the opponent does not
deny the allegation, the instrument's execution is deemed admitted,' 4
and when thus admitted it need not be introduced in evidence. 15 If
the opponent admits the execution and attacks the instrument for lack
of consideration, he must deny not only the particular consideration
divulge the facts) ; or the presumption may originate as a means of handicapping an anti-social contention (the presumption of legitimacy). The presumption of consideration to support a writing belongs to the first group and
has its source in probability. It may be termed a rebuttable, mandatory presumption. That is, the party against whom it works may offer evidence to
rebut the inference, but if no evidence is offered and the allegation giving rise
to the presumption (the allegation of making of a written agreement) is either
admitted or proved, the jury must find in accord with the inference. See,
Chafee, Progress of the Law, Evidence (1921) 35 HAav. L. Rnv. 302, 311;
McCormick, Presumptions and Burden of Proof (1927) 5 N. C. L. REv. 291,
303; Bohlen, The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon the Burdett
of Proof (1920) 68 U. PA. L. Ray. 307, 314.
' A contract which is not entirely in writing is regarded as an oral contract
and the proponent must allege and prove the consideration. Flores v. Baca,
25 N. M. 424, 184 Pac. 532 (1919); a "writing" may be a telegram, Western
Twine Co. v. Wright, 11 S. D. 521, 78 N. W. 942, 44 L. R. A. 438 (1899) ; or
it may be an entry in minutes of a meeting, Delta County v. Blackburn, 90 S.
W. 902 (Tex. Civ. App. 1905). '
" Cuthill v. Peabody, 19 Cal. App. 304, 125 Pac. 926 (1912).
u Kenigsberg v. Reiniger, 159 Iowa 548, 141 N. W. 407 (1913) ; Williams v.
Hall, 79 Cal. 564, 21 Pac. 965 (1889); Mo. REV. STAT. (1919) §2160; Baldwin's Supp. to Carroll's Kentucky Stat. (1928) §42; it has been declared that
if such is unnecessarily alleged it must be proved, Bronston v. Lakes, 135 Ky.
173, 121 S. W. 1021 (1909). However, Tennessee requires that the consideration be alleged in suits on all contracts except negotiable paper; the statute
changes the burden of proof but not the rules of pleading. See Roper v. Stone,
Cooke (Tenn.), 497, 499 (1813).
"See SHIPMAN, COMMON LAW PLEADING (1923) 240.
"See CLARa, CODE PLEADING (1928) 190-191, 162, 154; McINTosH, N. C.
PaAc. AND PROc. (1929) 396-397.
" Bruner v. St. Louis and Santa Fe Ry., 52 Okla. 349, 152 Pac. 1103
(1915).
ISt. Louis and Santa Fe Ry. v. Driggers, 65 Okla. 297, 166 Pac. 703 (1917).

NOTES AND COMMENTS
which the proponent possibly unnecessarily alleged, 'but must specifically deny that there is any consideration. 16 Should, however, the
opponent answer that the recital of consideration in the instrument
is incorrect and the proponent reply confessing the incorrectness but
alleging the existence of other consideration, the original presumption
is destroyed. 17 If failure of consideration as distinguished from want
of consideration is the ground of defense the opponent must show
the extent of failure. The proponent is not required to show that
the consideration still has some value after the opponent has indicated
a partial failure. And if total failure is required for avoiding the
instrument, as in the case of an account stated, the proponent wins
unless the party attacking shows total failure. These rules are the
same as those at common law. 18 The opponent must not only plead
lack or failure of consideration, 19 but must offer evidence which sustains his contention, and if he does not offer such evidence, though
the proponent has done no more than prove execution of the writing,
it is error for the court not to direct for the proponent on this issue.20
The states which declare the writing "presumptive evidence" also
enact that "the burden of showing want of consideration sufficient to
support an instrument lies with the party seeking to invalidate or
avoid it" ;21 and this construction is placed on the other statutes of
type (1) by the courts. The cases do not provide a clear-cut determination of what is "the burden" which is thus placed on the opponent. In some states the effect of the statutes has been to require
the party attacking the writing to "prove by a preponderance of
evidence" that the writing is unsupported by consideration. 22 And
this has meant that if the evidence is confusing, if there is equally as
"Cordes v. Hardin, 27 Cal. App. 474, 150 Pac. 650 (1915).

'Whitaker v. Holcomb, 177 Ky. 279, 198 S. W. 533 (1917).
" Merchants Nat Bank v. Carmichael, 50 Cal. App. 749, 196 Pac. 76

(1921) ; Powell v. Sturgeon, 299 S. W. 274 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
For the method of pleading lack or failure of consideration at common
law and under the codes, see SHIPMAN, op. cit. supra note 12 at 322; CLARX,
op. cit. supra note 13 at 145, 395, 424; McINTosH, op. cit. supra note 13 at 483;
Greer v. Latimer, 47 S. C. 176, 25 S. E. 136 (1896).
" Bruner v. St. Louis and Santa Fe Ry., supra note 14.
'Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, South Dakota.
'Keating v. Morrissey, 6 Cal. App. 163, 91 Pac. 677 (1907)" (must overcome and dispel the presumption); Combs v. Combs, 130 Ky. 827, 114 S. W.
334 (1908) (clear and convincing proof) ; First Presbyterian Church v. Dennis,
178 Iowa 1352, 161 N. W. 183 (1917) (must show by a preponderance of evidence) ; Shelton v. St. Louis Ry., 131 Missouri App. 560, 110 S. W. 627 (1908)
(presumption must be overthrown by competent proof); Ford v. Drake, 46
Mont 314, 127 Pac. 1019 (1912) (preponderance of evidence) ; First Nat. Bank
v. Radke, 51 N. W. 246, 199 N. W. 930 (1924) (same); Ball v. White, 50
Okla. 429, 150 Pac. 901 (1915) (same).
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much to support a finding of consideration as there is to support the
contrary, then the party relying on the writing is entitled to the
verdict. In other states the courts do not talk of preponderances and
the cases seem to involve the question whether the party attacking
must produce evidence sufficient to raise a question.2 3 When his
evidence thus rebuts the presumption he is safe from having a verdict
directed against him. It is significant, however, that in these cases
the opponent had offered little or no evidence and the courts may not
have talked of preponderances because it was altogether unnecessary.
The result is that half of the courts have said the opponent has the
"burden of persuasion," 24 and, while the position of the other courts
is uncertain it seems likely that in a proper case they will take the
same view.
The Uniform Written Obligations Act, our type (3), was intended for adoption, and types (2) and (1) are actually found only
in states which have abolished the common-law efficacy of the seal on
private contracts. All three types were designed to alleviate the
awkwardness in which lawyers found themselves when seals were
abolished and they were deprived of a formal substitute for consideration in legitimate but gratuitous transactions. Statutes of type
(1) also expedite judicial proceedings on contracts in that they recognize the usual situation and require the party who relies on the less
frequent case to establish the lack of consideration. It is only in this
latter connection that such legislation could contribute much in a state
like North Carolina, where the original force of the seal remains
unimpaired. It is believed, however, that this gain would be considerable, and it is therefore suggested that the General Assembly
enact a statute reading substantially as follows:
"In actions or counterclaims upon contracts completely in writing, it shall not be necessary for the party suing or claiming thereon
to make any allegations with reference to consideration for the contract. Want of consideration, in such cases, shall constitute a del Western
Twine Co. v. Wright,has11 S. D. 521, 78 N. W. 942 (1899).
The view that the proponent
always the burden of persuasion is supported by the weight of authority in cases not involving this statutory presumption. See WIGmOREj EVIDENCE, §§2485, 2487; THAYER, A PRELIMINARY
TRF._ATSE ON EvIDENcE AT CommoN LAw, 383; Note (1925) 35 A. L. R. 1370.
However, the view that the opponent, who is required to plead lack of consideration, has the burden of persuading the jury is consistent with the observation that "The burden of persuasion is usually determinable at the end
of the pleadings, upon the basis that he who pleads a fact (as distingilished
from one who denies a previous allegation) has the burden of convincing the
jury of its truth." See McCormick, op. cit. supra note 8 at 306.
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fense, which must be specially pleaded, supported by evidence, and
sustained by the greater weight of the evidence."
E. M. PERIINS,
M. T. VAN HECKo.

Bills and Notes-Acceleration Clause in Mortgage as
Affecting Maturity of Notes-Distribution of
Proceeds of Foreclosure Sale
A recent North Carolina case indicated by dictum that a holder of
a negotiable note which referred on its face to a mortgage containing
an acceleration provision was bound by the terms of such provision.
The same case held that where the foreclosure was accelerated, all
notes secured by the mortgage should share pro rata in the proceeds
of the sale.' Thus there is raised the question of North Carolina's
attitude in the situation where a note, unconditional on its face, is
secured by a mortgage or deed of trust in which a clause of acceleration is written.
It is well settled that an acceleration provision in a mortgage securing a bond or note containing no such stipulation, operates upon the
bond or note, at least to the extent of rendering the debt due for the
purpose of foreclosing upon default. 2 This rule applies where the
default is in a payment of interest, 3 of principal, 4 or of one of a
'Bank of Clinton v. Goldsboro Savings and Trust Company, 199 N. C., 582,
155 S. E. 261 (1930).
This note does not consider the matter of notice as affecting either the
negotiability of the instrument or the rights of the holder. It would seem
that an endorsee who is in other respects a holder in due course should not
be subjected to defenses contained in a mortgage solely because the note
secured contains a reference to the mortgage. This view would facilitate
negotiation, and would seem compatible with N. C. ANx. CoDE (Michie, 1927)
§3037, providing that
"To constitute a notice of an infirmity in the instrument or defect in the
title of the person negotiating the same the person to whom it is negotiated
must have had actual knowledge of the infirmity or defect or knowledge of
such facts that his action in taking the instrument amounted to bad faith."
See note in 34 A. L. R. 1377 (1925) ; Brannan, NESoTrnE INsTRUMENTS

LAW (4th ed. 1926) §57, p. 489.
As to the effect of public records on one's character as a holder in due
course see Foster v. Augustanna College, 92 Okla. 96, 218 Pac. 335 (1923);
37 A. L. R. 860 (1925); Brannan, NGoTIAmE INSTRUmENTs LAW (4th ed.

1926) §56, p. 458.
'Hyman v. Devereux, 63 N. C. 624 (1869); Barbee v. Scoggins, 121 N. C.
136, 28 S. E. 259 (1897) ; Gore v. Davis, 124 N. C. 234, 32 S.E. 554 (1899).
'Commonwealth Farm Loan Co. v. Caudle, 203 Ky. 761, 263 S. W. 24
(1924) ; Gore v. Davis, supra note 2.
'Barbee v. Scoggins, supra note 2; Miller v. Mariner, 187 N. C. 449, 121
S. E. 770 (1924).
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series of notes maturing periodically.5 In all such cases, failure to
meet the obligation gives the holder a right to foreclose and apply the
proceeds, not merely to that portion of the debt which is then due, but
6
to the entire indebtedness.
The courts are divided on the question as to whether or not a
default would mature the debt for purposes other than foreclosing.
The majority hold that where a note is secured by a mortgage in
which is written a clause of acceleration, the two instruments are to
be construed together. The acceleration provision thus enters into
and becomes a part of the note, so that the maturity of the note is
advanced in like manner with the maturity of the mortgage, not only
for the purposes of foreclosure, but for all purposes. 7 The effect of
this would be that, should a sale by foreclosure fail to yield the entire
indebtedness, an action would lie for the deficit.8
Most acceleration clauses provide in substance that should there
be a default in payment of principal or interest, the holder may declare the entire indebtedness due, and proceed to foreclose. A few
clauses, however, provide as follows: "Should the mortgagor default
in the payment of any installment of principal or interest as the same
shall become due, the mortgagee may proceed to foreclose, and apply
the proceeds, or so much of them as may be necessary, to the payment
of the debt." Even in jurisdictions adopting the majority rule, it is
doubtful if the latter class of provisions, omitting as they do any
reference to the maturity of the notes, should serve to cause the indebtedness in its entirety to become due for all purposes. If the aim
of the courts is to give effect to the intention of the parties, it would
appear that this type of acceleration provision should serve only to
allow an immediate foreclosing, since to allow an action for any deficit
would be to add by possibly unwarranted implication a right not
ceded by the debtor. And it is so held in several jurisdictions. 9
Opposed to the rule laid down by the majority that an acceleration
provision in a mortgage accelerates also the indebtedness secured
thereby, is a line of cases holding that where a note is unconditional
'Whitehead v. Morrill, 108 N. C. 65, 12 S. E. 894 (1891).
"Whitehead v. Morrill, supra note 5.

"Durham v. Rasco, 30 N. M. 16, 227 Pac. 559 (1924); Note (1925) 34
A. L. R. 848.
'Fox v. Gray, 105 Iowa 133, 75 N. W. 339 (1898); Wilson v. Kirclean,

143 Wash. 342, 255 Pac. 368 (1927).

o Hall v. Jameson, 151 Cal. 606, 91 Pac. 518 (1907); Trask v. Karrick, 94
Vt. 70, 108 Atl. 846 (1920); but see Coffin v. Younker, 196 Iowa 1021, 195
N. W. 591 (1923). (This case would seem to indicate that in Iowa a declaration that the indebtedness is due is a condition precedent to foreclosure.)
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on its face, its maturity cannot be accelerated by any provision existing in a separate instrument.' 0 North Carolina has definitely sided
with this minority," although an earlier decision seemed to indicate

otherwise.' 2
In this state we proceed upon the theory that one holding a note
secured by a mortgage has, in effect, a double remedy to recover his
debt-a suit in equity to subject the land to its payment, and an action
at law upon the note. A recovery may be had on the one, even though

there may be some technical difficulty to a recovery upon the other.13
When the clause is in the mortgage alone, it is held, in this jurisdic-

tion, that the provision is in direct conflict with the face of the note
itself, and it cannot be supposed that the parties intended to introduce
a secret clause into the negotiable instrument. In such a case the
force of this provision is spent in allowing a foreclosure of the mortgage and a sale of the property.' 4 If the acceleration clause appears
on the face of the note, however, the power of foreclosure is accelerated with the indebtedness even though no provision to that
effect appears on the mortgage. This results from the equitable doc15
trine that the mortgage follows the debt.
Burnside v. Craig, 140 Minn. 404, 168 N. W. 175 (1918) ; Winne v. La
Hart, 155 Minn. 307, 193 N. W. 587 (1923) ; Baird v. Meyer, 55 N. D. 930,
215 N. W. 542 (1927).
Capehart v. Dettrick, 91 N. C. 344 (1884); Meadows Co. v. Bryan, 195
N. C. 398, 142 S. E. 487 (1928) ; Brown v. Osteen, 197 N. C. 305, 148 S. E.
434 (1929).
'In Gore v. Davis, 124 N. C. 234, 32 S. E. 554 (1899) the note sued on
-was dated Oct 19th, 1897, payable three years after date, but the interest was
made payable semi-annually. The mortgage to secure the debt specified, "If
default shall be made in payment of said note or interest on the same or any
part of either at maturity" the creditor could proceed to sell the land, and out
of the proceeds of the sale "pay said bond and interest on the same." The
'defendant failed to pay the interest which fell due April 19th, 1898. It was
held, "by the conditions of the mortgage the principal and interest became
due. The demurrer of the defendant, that this action for judgment on the
note and foreclosure of the mortgage was premature, was properly overruled."
It is probable, however, that here the action was simply for foreclosure and
for application of the proceeds to the entire indebtedness.
While under the present rule in North Carolina an independent action
could not be maintained on a note until the maturity of the note as evidenced
on its face, where the only clause accelerating the debt is written into the mortgage, yet it does not appear untenable that a recovery of any deficit which the
property failed to yield might be allowed as part of the remedy of foreclosure
'by virtue of N. C. ANN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §507. This statute provides for a
complete settlement of the rights of all parties in a proceeding to foreclose.
See also Kiger v. Harmon, 113 N. C. 406, 18 S. E. 515 (1893); McINTosix,
NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1929) §431.
' Capehart v. Dettrick, supra note 11; Long v. Miller, 93 N. C. 227 (1885);
McINrosH, op. cit., supra note 12, §161.
" Capehart v. Dettrick, supra note 11.
'Humphreys v. Stevens, 191 N. C. 101, 131 S. E.383 (1926).
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In those states holding that an acceleration provision in a mortgage
serves to allow only a foreclosure on default, it seems that clauses
providing that on default the indebtedness shall become due, and those
which direct only a foreclosure are on an equal footing. Both serve
only to accelerate the foreclosure without maturing the note for other
purposes. 6
Once it is determined that an acceleration provision allows a foreclosure at a premature date, but leaves the note itself unmatured, an
interesting problem is presented as to the distribution of the proceeds
of the foreclosure sale. Should they be applied only to the payment
of such notes or instruments as on their face have matured; should
the proceeds be placed in the custody of the court pending the maturity of the entire obligation, and then be distributed pro rata; or
should the proceeds be distributed pro rata among the holders at
once? To devote the proceeds to only those notes which have matured would be to give unjustly a preference to certain notes at the
expense of the holders of the others. Obviously this would be contrary to the intention of the maker, who intended the mortgage to
secure the entire debt. If, on the other hand, the proceeds are to be
ratably distributed among the holders of the various notes, it would
be useless and cumbersome to follow the second above procedure,
and tie up the funds in court pending a future distribution that could
as effectively be made at once. Thus the best procedure is to allow
a pro rata distribution of the proceeds of the sale at once, and this is
the practice adopted by the North Carolina courts. 17

One case held

that if, in a series of notes, the payee himself held the later ones
unassigned; in a contest between himself and a holder of the earlier
notes, the indorsee of the earlier notes would be entitled to be paid in
"Whitehead v. Morrill, 108 N. C. 65, 12 S. E. 894 (1891) (providing only
for power of sale on default) ; Brown v. Osteen, 197 N. C. 305, 148 S. E. 434
(1929) (providing for maturity of debt on default).
Certain acceleration clauses provide that a default shall mature the indebtedness or power to foreclose. Others state that a default shall allow the
mortgagee to exercise the power of foreclosure, or' allow him the option to
declare the indebtedness due. All of these seem to be considered by the North
Carolina courts as simply raising an option in the mortgagee, which may be
waived by him. It is also held that an exercise of the power to foreclose on
default does not constitute an exercise of the option to declare the note due,
so as to start the running of the statute of limitation on the note. Such foreclosure does not therefore bar a subsequent action for any deficit.
McINTosH, op. cit. supra note 12, §169 (6) ; Walter v. Kilpatrick, 191 N. C.
458, 132 S. E. 148 (1926). See generally Note (1925) 34 A. L. R. 897; Taylor v. National Bank, 63 Fla. 631, 57 So. 678 (1912).
" Kitchin v. Grandy, 101 N. C. 86, 7 S. E. 663 (1888).
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full.1 8 It should be noted, however, that this apparent priority results not from the relation between the endorsee and the mortgagor,
but because such endorsee would be entitled to full payment from the
endorser by reason of his endorsement. Priority of assigned notes
was properly denied in the principal case where the endorsement was
without recourse.1 9
W. S. MALONE.
Conditional Sales-Registration-Priority of Conditional
Vendor's Claim to Fixtures against Purchaser of Real
Estate under Foreclosure of Prior Mortgage
In the case of Standard Motors Finance Company v. Weaver
et at.,1 the plaintiff had sold by registered conditional sales contract, a
sprinkler system to the owner of real property which was encumbered
by a prior mortgage. The defendant became purchaser of the realty
at the foreclosure sale, subsequent to the installation of the sprinkler
system. Action to compel delivery of the sprinkler to the plaintiff.
Held, for plaintiff.
By the majority rule, where a chattel has been sold under a titleretention agreement and affixed to real estate, the claim of the conditional vendor to such chattel is superior to that of a prior mortgagee
of the realty if the article is removable without material injury to
the realty.2 Since the security of the prior mortgagee is not injured,
he having advanced nothing on faith of an interest in the newly
acquired property, the question of notice to the prior mortgagee of the
conditional sales agreement and retention of title is not to be considered. On the other hand, it is equally well settled that where the
owner of the realty upon which the chattel has been affixed, subsequently sells or mortgages the realty to a good faith purchaser or
mortgagee without notice, such mortgagee or purchaser will prevail
over the conditional sales vendor.3 The conditional vendor having so
" See Whitehead v. Morrill, 108 N. C. 65, 68, 12 S. E. 894 (1891).
"Bank of Clinton v. Trust Co., 199 N. C. 582, 155 S. E. 261 (1930).
'199 N. C. 178, 153 S.E. 861 (1930).
'Cox v. New Bern Lighting and Fuel Co., 151 N. C. 62, 67 S. E. 477
(1909); Standard Dry Kiln Co. v. Ellington, 172 N. C. 481, 90 S. E. 564
(1916) ; Holt. v. Henley, 232 U. S. 637, 34 Sup. Ct. 459, 58 L. ed. 767 (1913) ;

Detroit Steel Cooperage Co. v. Sisterville Brewing Co., 233 U. S. 712, 34 Sup.
Ct. 753, 58 L. ed. 1166 (1913).
3J. H. Day Co. et al. v. Public Savings Ins. Co. of America, 151 N. E. 361
(nd. 1926) ; Oakland Bank of Savings v. California Pressed Brick Co., 183
Cal. 295, 191 Pac. 524 (1920) ; Union Bank and Trust Co. v. Fred W. Wolfe
Co., 114 Tenn. 255, 86 S. W. 310, 108 Am. St. Rep. 903 (1905); see Note
(1921) 13 A. L. R. 461.

206

THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

placed the property that it appears to be a part of the realty is
estopped to deny that it is realty as against a subsequent good faith
purchaser or mortgagee. The principal case would seem to come
within the first of the two doctrines stated above. Although the defendant was in a sense a good faith purchaser, yet being a purchaser
under the prior mortgagee he stands in the same position as the mortgagee,' and therefore should be likewise bound by the terms of the
conditional sales agreement without regard to notice. In an earlier
case the North Carolina court held that an unrecorded conditional
sales contract was binding as against a prior mortgagee of the realty.6
On the basis of this decision, the result reached in the instant case
necessarily would have been the same had the plaintiff's conditional
sales contract been unrecorded."
A recent Georgia decision" serves as an example of the second
class of cases under consideration, and raises the issue of notice to a
subsequent purchaser of the realty. The owner of real property installed thereon bathroom fixtures purchased from the plaintiff by a
conditional sale agreement. The plaintiff registered the sales contract
as a chattel mortgage. Later the defendant became purchaser of the
realty, and in an action by the plaintiff to recover the fixtures, held,
registration of the conditional sales contract in the chattel mortgage
records was not sufficient to put the defendant on notice, and as a
purchaser in good faith subsequent to the annexation and without
notice, he was entitled to retain the fixtures. The holding seems to
be supported by considerable authority.8 The case provides an ex"Kohler Co. v. Brasun, 222 N. Y. App. Div. 338, 226 N. Y. Supp. 60 (1927);
Central Union Gas Co. v. Browning, 210 N. Y. 10, 103 N. E. 822 (1913);
Craine Silo Co. v. Alden State Bank, 218 N. Y. App. Div. 263, 218 N. Y. Supp.
143 (1926) ; 13 Cop. L. Q. 434 (1928) ; see 3 JoNEs, MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928)

§2122.

'Standard Dry Kiln Co. v. Ellington, supra note 2. But see Clark v. Hill,
117 N. C. 11, 23 S. E. 91, 53 Am. St. Rep. 574 (1895) (Action by conditional
vendor of fixture against grantee of purchaser of realty under foreclosure of
prior mortgage; held that since the conditional sale was unrecorded the title
to the fixture went to the prior mortgagee and from him to the purchaser,
and judgment given for defendant. The case is not referred to either in the
Dry Kiln Co. Case or in the Standard Motors Finance Co. Case).
'Cf. Industrial Bank of Richmond v. Holland Furnace Co. et at., 153 S. E.
309T (W. Va. 1930).
Skinner et al. v. Stewart Plumbing Co., 155 S. E. 97 (Ga. 1930).
'Tibbetts v. Home, 65 N. H. 242, 23 Atl. 145, 23 Am. St. Rep. 31, 15 L. R.
A. 56 (1889); Elliott v. Hudson, 18 Cal. App. 642, 124 Pac. 103 (1912);
EwE.L, FixTuRns, 486 (2nd ed.). Contra: Liddell Co. v. Cork et a., 120 S. C.
481, 113 S. E. 327, 23 A. L. R. 800 (1922); Sword v. Low, 122 Ill. 487, 13
N. E. 826 (1887); Eaves v. Estes, 10 Kan. 314, 15 Am. Rep. 345 (1872);
Monarch Laundry Co. v. Westbrook, 109 Va. 382, 63 S. E. 1070 (1909); see
2a UNioRm LAws ANNOTATED (1924) §67.
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cellent illustration of the inadequacy of the general statutory provisions, such as prevail in Georgia9 and North Carolina o for the
registration of conditional sales, with reference to notice regarding
the status of chattels which are subsequently to be affixed to real
estate. The plaintiff registered the sales contract precisely according
to the requirements of the statute, yet fulfillment of these requirements failed to give notice to the defendant since the defendant could
not be bound to search the personal property records to determine the
state of title of the fixtures, ostensibly a part of the realty. The
Georgia and North Carolina type of statute applies to conditional sales
of all chattels, and does not anticipate the circumstance of annexation
of the chattel to realty. It seems that relief from this difficulty could
be had most readily by the adoption of an act similar in form to section seven of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, 1 providing that
conditional sales of chattels to be affixed to realty should be registered
in a separate record book in the office of the Register of Deeds for
the locality in which the chattels are to be attached, together with a
short description of the realty to which the chattels are to be attached.

J. G. ADAMS,

Ja.

Constitutional Law-Elections-Race Discrimination-Party
Rules Excluding Negroes from Voting in Primaries
The Constitution of Virginia provides that the legislature shall
enact such laws as are necessary and proper for the regularity and
purity of general and primary elections.' A statute passed pursuant
thereto provides that persons not disqualified by reason of other requirements in the party to which he belongs may vote at the primary. 2
The State Democratic Committee excluded all negroes from the
party primaries. In a case brought by a qualified negro voter against
the primary election judges it was held that the above statute is invalid as authorizing the disqualification of voters in primary elections
by discriminatory tests based on color contrary to the Federal Constitutional Amendments Fourteen and Fifteen.3
A political party is an unincorporated voluntary association of
persons sponsoring certain political principles and is in no sense a
*GA. ANat. CODE (Michie, 1926) §§3259, 3319.
"N. C. AxN. CODE (Michie, 1927) §3312.
u2a UNInORm LAWS ANxN. (1924) §64.
CONsT. VA.
2

(1902) §36.

Cona VA. (1919) §228, as amended by AcTs 1924, c. 286.

'Bliley v. West, 42 F. (2d) 101 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
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governmental agency.4 Yet, because of the public importance of
securing proper party nominations, the regulation within reasonable
limits of party primary elections is universally held to be the proper
subject of state legislation under the general power of the state to
supervise the entire election system. 5 The general tendency of primary election laws is to protect the rights of voters in much the same
manner as in general elections. 6 The test of party affiliation may be
imposed or left to the determination of the party itself. 7 It is said
that it was not intended by the primary laws to intrude unreasonably
upon domestic affairs of political parties, not agencies of the state,
nor were such matters within the subject of the Federal Constitution
in declaring who are qualified to vote.8
The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments apply only to the
wrongs of states or of some governmental agency acting for the state;
if the wrong is that of a private individual or group, no action may
be maintained thereunder. 9 The right of a political party to make
discriminatory tests apply to primaries depends upon the extent to
which primaries have become a part of the electoral machinery of the
state. There is a split of authority upon the question whether primary elections are included in the word "election" as used in general
constitutional and statutory provisions.1 0
'Robinson v. Holman, 181 Ark. 428, 26 S.W. (2d) 66 (1930) ; Newberry
v. U. S., 256 U. S.232, 41 Sup. Ct. 469, 65 L. ed. 913 (1921); U. S. v. Gradwell, 243 U. S.476, 37 Sup. Ct. 407, 61 L. ed. 857 (1916) ; Waples v. Marrast,
108 Tex. 5, 11, 184 S. W. 180, L. R. A. 1917A 253 (1916).
'See Peo. v. Board of Election Comm's., 221 Ill. 9, 77 S.E. 321, 5 ANN.
CAS. 562 (1906) ; Ladd v. Holmes, 40 Ore. 167, 66 Pac. 714, 91 Am. St. Rep.
457 (1901) ; Winston v. Moore, 244 Pa. 447, 91 Atl. 520, L. R. A. 1915A 1190,
ANN. CAS. 1915C 498; Note 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 133.
' Peo. v. King's Cty. Dem. Comm's., 164 N. Y. 335, 58 N. E. 124, 51 L. R. A.
674 (1900) ; Peo. v. Strassheim, 240 Ill.
279, 88 N. E. 821, 22 L. R. A. (N. S.)
1135 (1900).
State v. Felton, 77 Ohio 554, 84 N. E. 85, 12 ANN. CAs. 65 (1908) ; Peo. v.
Kings Cty. Dem. Comm's., supra note 6; Hager v. Robinson, 154 Ky. 489, 157
S. W. 1138 (1913).
'See Wilkinson v. Henry, 128 So. 362, 366 (Ala. 1930) citing 2 COOLEY,
CoNsT. Lim. (8th ed. 1927) 1360, 1370; U. S. v. Gradwell, supra note 4; U. S.
v. Newberry, supra note 4.
' Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S.3, 3 Sup. Ct. 18, 27 L. ed. 835 (1883) ; James
v. Bowman, 190 U. S.127, 23 Sup. Ct. 678, 47 L. ed. 979 (1903); see Guinn v.
"U.S., 238 U. S.347, 354, 35 Sup. Ct. 926, 59 L. ed. 1340, L. R. A. 1916A 1124
(1915).
"A primary is not an election: State v. Flaherty, 23 N. D. 313, 136 N. W.
76 (1912); State v. Simmons, 117 Ark. 159, 174 S. W. 238 (1915); Note
(1909) 18 L. R. A. (N. S.) 412. A primary is an election: Peo. v. Board
Election Comm's, supra note 5; Britton v. Election Comm's, 129 Cal. 337, 61
Pac. 1115, 15 L. R. A. 115 (1901). Note (1930) 15 CoRxr. L. Q. 262, 265, "A
survey of the decided cases shows that ten states hold that a primary election
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It is clear that a state can not directly exclude the negro from
voting in a party primary, a Texas statute of this purport having
been declared unconstitutional."
The instant case holds that the
Virginia Legislature is unable to authorize the doing of an act which

it could not do directly and that the attempt is one at delegation of
legislative power, itself unconstitutional.

A later Texas statute'12

authorizing the political parties to make their own requirements for
members voting in primaries has been upheld. 13 The right of the
Democratic Party to exclude negroes from their primaries in Arkansas was affirmed in a recent case (the Federal Supreme Court refusing certiorari, stating that it had no jurisdiction.)' 4 The Texas and
Arkansas laws permit the same result as the Virginia statute, but the
discrepancy of decisions as to their validity may be explained somewhat by the status of the primary in these states. In Virginia the
expenses of the primary are paid from public funds, and the primary
is "an inseparable part of the election of the state."' 5 In the other
two states the primaries can not be paid for by public money, and are

not regarded as elections within the meaning of constitutional provisions and statutes thereunder relating to suffrage1 6 In the absence
of statutes to the contrary, political parties are governed by their own
usages and have an inherent power to regulate their own affairs.lr
As long as the primary is not made a part of the state election system
is not an 'election,' while on the other hand, twelve states hold that a primary
election is an 'election.'"
' Tzx. Rrv. Civ. STAr. (Vernon, 1925) art. 3107 in part read, "In no event
shall a negro be eligible to participate in a Democratic primary election in the
state of Texas." In Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536, 47 Sup. Ct. 446, (1926)
declaring the statute invalid, Justice Holmes said, "We find it unnecessary to
consider the Fifteenth Amendment, because it seems to us hard to imagine a
more direct and obvious infringement of the Fourteenth. That Amendment,
while it applies to all, was passed, as we know, with a special intent to protect
the blacks from discrimination against them."
REv. ST. TEx. 1925, art. 3107 (re-enacted 1927), "Every political party
in this state through the state executive committee shall have the power to
prescribe the qualifications of its own members and shall in its own way determine who shall be qualified to vote or otherwise participate in such political
party."
Grigsby v. Harris, 27 F. (2d) 942 (D.C. Tex. 1928) ; Nixon v. Condon,
34 F. (2d) 464 (D.C. Tex. 1929).
' Robinson v. Holman, supra note 4 (certiorari denied Nov. 24, 1930, U. S.
Daily, Nov. 26, 1930, at 2945).
Com. v. Wilcox, 111 Va. 859, 69 S.E. 1031 (1911).
Nixon v. Condon, 'supranote 13; Waples v. Marrast, supra note 4; Robinson v. Holman, supra note 4. But see Note (1930) 15 CORN. L. Q. 262; and
Note (1930) 43 HARv. L. REv. 467 (that Va. decision should apply also to
Texas).
'See Socialist Party v. Uhl, 155 Cal. 776, 792, 103 Pac. 181 (1908) ; Note
(1927) 5 Tzx. L. Rxv. 393 (as to status of primary in Texas).
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and incorporated therein by statutory provisions and regulations, the
party would seem to be empowered to make its own requirements for
primary voting in accord with any conception of the Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments yet advanced.

TRAvis BROWN.
Contempt-Liability of Former Agent for Violation of
Injunction in Independent Capacity

An injunction prohibited "the defendant (John Staff) his agents,
employees, associates and confederates" from infringing complainant's patent. One Joseph Staff was originally a party to the suit, as
were two other Staffs, 'but the latter were not served and the suit was
dismissed as to Joseph upon the defendant's proof that he was not a
partner but a salesman. Joseph left the defendant's employ and
established a business for himself, in the conduct of which he in-

fringed complainant's patent.

The District Court, in proceedings

begun by the complainant in connection with the original suit, fined
Joseph for contempt. On appeal to the Circuit Court of Appeals, the
order was reversed in an opinion by Judge Learned Hand.'
A party defendant to an injunction suit may be dealt with for
contempt, though he violates the injunction in a new guise. 2 Members of a class, collectively enjoined in an equitable or statutory3
representative suit, may be held in contempt for individual disobedience.4 But when an injunction issues against a named defendant,
and his agents, employees, associates, etc., these groups are not
thereby made parties for this purpose. 5 They are included in the
terms of the order to prevent the defendant from circumventing the
1
Alemite Mfg. Co. v. Staff, 42 Fed. (2d) 832 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1930).
'Donaldson v. Roksament Co., 176 Fed. 368 (C. C. E. D. N. Y. 1910);
Bernard v. Frank, 179 Fed. 516 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1910); Smith v. Yates, 244 Fed.
793 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1917).
'See CLARK, CODE PLEADING (1928) 276-282. The North Carolina statute,
N. C. CoDn AxN. (Michie, 1927) §457, has been narrowly construed. Tucker
v. Eatough, 186 N. C. 504, 120 S. E. 57 (1923); Citizen's Co. v. Asheville
Typographical Union, 187 N. C. 42, 121 S. E. 31 (1924).
"Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U. S. 356, 366, 41 Sup. Ct. 338,
41 L. ed. 673 (1921) ; Am. Steele & Wire Co. v. Wire Drawers' Union, 90 Fed.
598 (C. C. N. D. Ohio, 1898).
'Mexican Ore Co. v. Guadalupe Mining Co., 47 Fed. 351 (D. N. J. 1891);
Dadirrian v. Gullian, 79 Fed. 784 (D. N. J. 1897) ; Playing Card Co. v. Spalding, 92 Fed. 368 (S. D. N. Y. 1899) ; Donaldson v. Roksament Stone Co., 178
Fed. 103 (E. D. N. Y. 1910); Bliss Co. v. Atlantic Handle Co., 212 Fed. 190
(D.Mass. 1913).
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decree by acting through them. And they,6 or, for that matter,
strangers 7 to the original suit, commit a contempt if they knowingly
act in aid of the party enjoined. Conversely, when a stranger to the
suit acts in a genuine independent capacity in doing the act he knows
the injunction defendant was prohibited from doing, he does not
violate the injunction and cannot strictly be guilty of contempt. 8
Here agreement of authority ends. Where the contempt proceeding is primarily to punish a respondent for disrespect of the court in
doing that which he knows the court was doing all in its direct power
to stop, a number of cases 9 have upheld fines and jail terms imposed
upon strangers apparently acting quite independently. This has
been particularly so in connection with strike injunctions. 10 And
even where the principal purpose of the contempt proceeding was to
coerce a respondent into giving the original complainant either monetary or specific relief, several discerning courts," motivated by a
belief that otherwise a subterfuge would be condoned, have reached
a similar result. That is to say, the disagreement is not so much over
the requirements of due process as it is over the flagrancy of the
defiance of the order, the bona fides of the apparent independence of
action, and the actual probabilities of connivance, in the particular
case.
The facts of the decision under review strongly suggest the possibility that Judge Learned Hand's brilliantly expressed fear of
4
Sickles v. Borden, 4 Blatchf. (U. S.) 14, Fed. Gas. no. 12, 833 (S. D. N. Y.
1857) ; In re Lennon, 166 U. S. 548, 17 Sup. Ct. 658, 41 L. ed. 1110 (1897) ;
L. E. Waterman Co. v. Standard Drug Co., 202 Fed. 167 (C. C. A. 6th, 1913) ;
Janney v. Pancoast International Ventilator Co., 124 Fed. 972 (C. C. E. D. Pa.
1903).
'Seward v. Patterson, 76 Law T. (N. S.) 215 (1897) ; Counkey v. Russell,
111 Fed. 417 (C. C. Ind. 1901) ; Bessette v. Conkey, 194 U. S. 324 (1904) ;
Garrigan v. U. S., 163 Fed. 16 (C. C. A. 7th, 1908) ; Lawson v. U. S.. 297 Fed.
418 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924) ; State v. City of Pittsburg, 80 Kan. 710, 104 Pac. 847
(1909) ; People ex rel 'Stearns v. Marr, 181 N. Y. 463, 74 N. E. 431, 106 Am.

St. Rep. 562, 3 Ann. Cas. 25 (1905).
'Omeliah v. American Cap Front Mfg. Co., 195 Fed. 539 (D. C. N. Y.
1912); M'Call v. Bladworth, 290 Fed. 365 (C. C. A. 2nd, 1923); Berger v.
Superior Court, 175 Cal. 719, 167 Pac. 143 (1917); Boyd v. State, 19 Neb. 128,
26 N. W. 925 (1886) ; Rigas v. Livingston, 178 N. Y. 20, 70 N. E. 107 (1904) ;
Strawberry Island Co. v. Cowles, 75 Misc. 279, 140 N. Y. S. 333 (1912); In
re Zimmerman, 134 App. Div. 591, 119 N. Y. Supp. 275 (1909) ; Slater v. Merritt, 75 N. Y. 268 (1878).
Chisoim v. Caines, 121 Fed. 397 (C. C. S. C. 1903), criticized in (1903)

17

HARv. L. REv. 133; In re Reese, 107 Fed. 942 (C. C. A. 8th, 1901); Lawson v.
U. 1S. supra note 7.
oSee FRANKFURTER AND GREENE, TmE LABOR IrjuNcTioN (1930) 123-130.
Wimpy v. Phinizy, 68 Ga. 188 (1881); Janey v. Pancoast International

Ventilator Co., supra note 6; Campbell v. Magnet Light Co., 175 Fed. 117
(C. C. N. Y. 1909).
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judicial tyranny represents a deliberate adherence to strict notions of
due process at the cost of the immediate needs of justice.
H. B. PAgKa.

Contracts-Consideration-Privilege of Cancellation
An automobile dealer's contract provided for cancellation by the
manufacturer without notice in the event of the dealer's death or
insolvency; on sixty days notice if any question arose threatening a
satisfactory business relationship; on ten days notice if the agency
ceased to deal exclusively in the manufacturer's products. If any
monthly allotment of cars was not shipped "for any reason whatsoever," that allotment could be cancelled by the manufacturer without
any responsibility in damages. The manufacturer cancelled the entire contract on the ground that the dealer was no longer an exclusive
agent. Upon the dealer's suit for damages, the jury found that the
agency had not ceased to be exclusive. The manufacturer contended
that the contract was void for lack of mutuality. Held, the contract
was valid.'
The "mutuality" necessary in a suit for damages for breach of a
contract is not to be confused with the "mutuality" required in connection with a suit for specific performance. In the former instance
it usually has to do with consideration. 2 The question does not arise
when there is some independent consideration other than the cancellable promise,8 nor when the party who once had the privilege of
withdrawal has performed.4
When the power to cancel is dependent upon some condition beyond the control of him who is to exercise it, such as, in the present
case, the dealer's death or insolvency, it seems to be almost uniformly
'Chevrolet Motor Co. v. Gladding, 42 F. (2d) 440 (C. C. A. 4th, 1930).
'Maurer Steel Barrel Co., Inc. v. Martin, 1 F. (2d) 687 (C.C. A. 3rd,
1924); Electric Management & Engineering Corp. v. United P. & L. Corp., 19

F. (2d) 311 (C.C. A. 8th, 1927). For full discussions of the subject, see Van
Hecke, Specific Performance of Inspection Incident to Option (1928) 12 MiNN.
L. R. 1; Corbin, The Effect of Options on Consideration (1925) 34 YALE L. J.
571.
'Louisville & N. k.R. Co. v. Cox, 145 Ky. 667, 141 S. W. 389 (1911) (injured employee waived cause of action in consideration of promise of permanent
employment); Chrisman v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 83 Cal. App. 249, 256
Pac. 618 (1927) ($1.00 paid for option to purchase). But cf. Velie Motor Car

Co. v. Kopmeier Motor Car Co., 194 Fed. 324 (C. C.A. 7th, 1912) ('1.00 each
to other paid" imports no consideration. Might have been a transfer of same
dollar).
'Gile v. Inter-State Motor Car Co., 27 N. D. 108, 145 N. W. 732 (1914);
1 Wnxisoi, CoNmAcrs (1920) §106.
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held that the contract is not wanting in consideration.
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Likewise,

when the cancellation becomes effective only after the lapse of a

specified period of time,6 consideration is present. The promisor is
bound at least for a time, and it cannot be said that his promise is
illusory.
But when there is an absolute privilege of immediate cancellation,
or a stipulation against responsibility for failure to perform, the
courts generally refuse to give effect to the contract on the theory
that the promisor can arbitrarily refuse to perform if he chooses, and
7
is therefore under no duty.
However, when such contracts are bona fide business transactions,
some courts will look at them against their respective business backgrounds and hold that the parties did not intend to permit an arbitrary
refusal to perform, hut that the cancellation clause was a protection
against unforeseeable commercial difficulties which might arise, to be
exercised only in a legitimate situation.8 Thus, the North Carolina
Supreme Court, although it once made an intimation to the contrary, 9
in 1926 upheld a contract similar to the one in the instant case. It
was held that the retention by both parties of the absolute power of
cancellation did not deprive the contract of consideration. 10
"Moon Motor Car Co. of N. Y. v. Moon Motor Car Co., 29 F. (2d) 3
(C. C. A. 2nd, 1928) (option to cancel upon "the violation of any of the conditions") ; Corbin, op. cit. upra note 2, at 589. But see Huffman v. PaigeDetroit Motor Car Co., 262 Fed. 116, 118 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919).
'Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 202 Pa. 210, 51 Atl. 973 (1902) (option
to cancel on ten days notice) ; Oldfield v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 198 Iowa 20, 199
N. W. 161 (1924) (option to cancel on five days notice); 1 WT.TIsToN, CoNTRACTs §140. But see Oakland Motor Car Co. v. Indiana Automobile Co.,
201 Fed. 499, 504 (C. C. A. 7th, 1912) (one ground for holding contract invalid
was privilege of cancellation on thirty days notice). In Chevrolet Motor Co.
v. McCullough, 6 F. (2d) 212 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925) only nominal damages were
allowed because of five day cancellation clause.
' Velie Motor Car Co. v. Kopmeier Motor Car Co., supra note 3 (vendor
had option to cancel); Weil v. Chicago Tool Co., 138 Ark. 534, 212 S. W. 313
(1919) (vendor was not liable for failure to ship any order.) ; 1 WILisToN,
CoNmAcTs §§104, 105; 1 PAGE, CONTRAcTS (2nd ed. 1922) §572.
'Handley-Mack Co. v. Godchaux Sugar Co., 2 F. (2d) 435 (C. C. A. 6th,
1924) (vendor not responsible for delivery unless "raws" received; implied
obligation to use reasonable diligence to obtain the raws); U. S. Expansion
Bolt Co. v. Marmerstein, 181 App. Div. 790, 169 N. Y. Supp. 244 (1918) (vendor
not liable if unable to perform; no privilege to act arbitrarily); cf. Dildine v.
Ford Motor Co., 159 Mo. App. 410, 140 S. W. 627 (1911) (prices and discounts
subject to change; no privilege to act capriciously) ; Wood v. Lucy, Lady DuffGordon, 222 N. Y. 88, 118 N. E. 214 (1917) (assumption of exclusive agency
implies a promise to use reasonable efforts to carry out its purpose).
'Erskine et al. v. Chevrolet Motor Co. et al., 185 N. C. 479, 117 S. E. 706
(1923) (The case turns on a subsequent oral agreement not to cancel. However, it is assumed that a contract very similar to the one in the principal case
would be void.).
Fawcett v. Fawcett, 191 N. C. 679, 132 S. E. 796 (1926).
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The principal case is supported -by the weight of authority as to
its views on all of the contract provisions except that relating to
cancellation of monthly allotments of cars. As to that, it is submitted
that the Circuit Court of Appeals, in holding that "the contract
properly construed confers to discretionary right on the seller to
refuse to sell the cars and parts," has caught the true spirit of such
contract provisions. Instead of a literal interpretation of the bare
language, the court first put the transaction in its proper atmosphere,
and then determined the business significance of the terms used. In
1929, the North Carolina court took a similar position in a less extreme case."
It should be noted, however, that the problem before the court was
not one of finding consideration for the defendant's promise, but
whether the defendant had ever made a promise capable of breach.
The two situations have frequently been confused in the cases.
While perhaps theoretically alike, in that a cancellable promise would
be juristically the same whether made 'by the present plaintiff or defendant, the two situations are actually distinct as to the way in which
they invoke the court's attention. In the consideration case, the defendant who has broken his unconditional promise insists that the
contract is void because the plaintiff retained a cancellation privilege
which, however, he has not exercised. In the other case, the present
one, the defendant has cancelled, and the question is mainly whether
he has acted in accordance with the terms of the contract. Here, the
dealer had neither died nor 'become insolvent; the jury had found
that the reason given for cancellation did not exist; the court, on the
ground of election, refused to permit the use of the sixty day clause;
and the court was not in a mood to listen sympathetically to the
defendant's final desperate plea that the whole contract be regarded as
a nullity because of the privileges and immunities retained by itself.
HUGH L. LOBDELL.

Criminal Law-Bad Checks-Criminal Liability of
Principal for Overdraft by Agent
Defendant employed an agent to buy oysters and gave him unlimited authority to draw checks upon defendant's bank account. In
Wellington-Sears & Co. v. Dize Awning and Tent Co., 196 N. C. 748, 147
S. E. 13 (1929), noted in (1929) 8 N. C.L. REv. 78 (Contract deprived vendee
of power to cancel entire contract if seller defaulted on instalment deliveries.

Vendee breached.).
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payment for oysters delivered to defendant, the agent drew a check
which was returned for insufficient funds. Defendant was indicted
for a violation of the bad check law.1 Held, not guilty. Defendant

was not present when the check was drawn; so there is no evidence

2
that he had actual or implied knowledge of the insufficiency of funds.
It is too well settled for dispute that a person causing a crime to be
committed through an innocent agent is himself a principal to the
crime although he was not present at the time and place thereof ;3
so the vital question is whether the unlimited authority given the
agent to draw checks upon defendant's account is sufficient evidence
to warrant a finding that defendant knew his funds were insufficient
to pay such checks.
The bad check law is an exercise of the police power and it does
not require that a criminal intent be shown. 4 The purpose of such a
statute is to require a degree of diligence for the protection of the
public which will make violation exceedingly improbable. 5 It is often
said to be the duty0 of the principal to see to it that such statutes are
not violated by his agents in the course of their employment.7
If a principal instructs his agent to draw checks within a certain
limit and the agent exceeds that limit, it would seem that the principal
should incur no criminal liability.8 However, it would also seem
that giving an agent unlimited authority to draw checks upon a principal who had authorized him to buy a particular commodity should
place upon the principal the risk of anticipating such checks as the
1

N. C. ANx. CoDE (Michie, 1927) §4283 (a).
'State v. Baker, 199 N. C. 578, 155 S. E. 249 (1930).
2CLARK & MARsHALT, CratEs (2d ed. 1912) 260; State v. Morey, 138 Atl.
474 (Me. 1927).
' State v. Yarboro, 194 N. C. 498, 506, 508, 140 S. E. 216 (1927).
"Mechem, Liability of a Principal for the Penal or Criminal Acts of his
Agent (1912) 11 MIcH. L. Rv. 93, 103; People v. Robey, 52 Mich. 577, 18
N. W. 365, 52 Am. Rep. 270 (1884).
'Liability would, perhaps, be a more accurate term, since the principal is
made responsible regardless of his care in such a case.
'Mechem, op. cit. supra note 5, at 104; CLARK & MARSHAL., op. cit. supra
note 2, at 265 (g); Com. v. Morgan, 107 Mass. 199 (1871) (agent prints a
libel); Ex parte Turnbull, 21 New S. Wales L. R. 414 (1900) (servant gives
unstamped receipt); Meigs v. State, 114 So. 448 (Fla. 1927) (agent unlawfully
possessed fish) ; State v. Kittelle, 110 N. C. 560, 565, 15 S. E. 103 (1892) (sale
of liquor to minors. The court reasoned thus: Either a principal is responsible
for illegal sales by his clerk or he has no authority to sell through the medium
of a clerk. Any other view would be illogical and a virtual repeal of the law.)
and see generally Note (1919) 43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 2.
'Mores v. State, 6 Conn. 9 (1825) ; CLARK & MARsHALL, op. cit. supra note
3, at 262; State v. Neal, 133 N. C. 689, 54 S. E. 756 (1903).
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agent might reasonably be expected to draw. 9 And that a failure to
so anticipate would be evidence from which the jury might imply
knowledge.10 Otherwise, "the appointment of an agent may result in
a convenient and effective method of abolishing the statute.""u
If in addition to the evidence in the instant case, it had appeared
that the commodity to be purchased would reasonably have cost five
hundred dollars and that the principal's bank account at no time
showed a deposit of over one hundred dollars, might not the jury
have been permitted to infer the knowledge required by the statute?
The instant case goes no further than to hold that giving an agent
unlimited authority to draw checks upon the principal's account is
not alone sufficient.
SUSIE SHARP.

Husband and Wfe-Estate by Entirety-Title by Estoppel
In a recent case1 land was deeded to one F. M. Knight and his
wife, L. E. Knight, as tenants by the entirety. Subsequently, the
husband made a deed of the land to his wife. Two years later the
wife made a deed to her husband and to herself, but the acknowledgment failed to comply with the provisions of the North Carolina
statute,2 and with the Constitution of North Carolina.3 All the conveyances were duly registered. The wife died before her husband.
I Com. v. Morgan, supra note 6; CLARK & MARSEAI, op. cit. supra note 3,
at 264, "He will be liable for his agent's act to the same extent as if they were
authorized by him, if they are due to want of proper care and oversight on his
part, or other negligence in reference to the business which he has intrusted
to the agent."
An apprehensive husband who allows his wife to draw upon his bank account might eliminate any possible danger to himself from her possible overdrafts by permitting her a bank account of her own.
The rule with reference t6 "joint bank accounts" might depend upon the
legal effect of such deposits. See generally Note L. R. A. 1917C 548. One
joint depositor, however, checks upon the account in his own right and not by
authority from the other and would be liable only when he had "actual or
implied
knowledge."
1
'If the statute means that actual knowledge is required and nothing short
of it will sustain a conviction, the instant case is clearly correct, and it will be
almost impossible to violate the act through an agent unless the check is issued
under the direction and in the presence of the principal. If such a narrow construction is to be put on the statute it should be amended to cover situations
where the defendant ought to have known of the insufficiency of funds if he
did not. The instant case, however, says, "to convict him for a crime under
the statute, either actual or implied knowledge is necessary when the check is
delivered."
' Supra note 2, at p. 582.
1

Capps v. Massey, 199 N. C. 196, 154 S. E. 52 (1930).
-IN. C. ANN. CODE- (Michie, 1927) §2515.
IN. C. CONsT., Art. X, §6.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
Plaintiffs, heirs at law of the husband, brought this action against
the defendants, heirs at law of the wife, to recover the land. Held,
defendants were owners of the land.
The original deed to the husband and wife created an estate by the
entirety in them, to which the incident of survivorship still attaches
in this State. 4 The estate may not be conveyed or encumbered by one
spouse without the assent of the other, or become subject to a lien
or proceeding to sell in satisfaction of any judgment against one of
them during their joint lives (thus the right of survivorship in the
other is protected).r However, the husband is entitled to the
usufruct of the land during the period that is held by the entirety; he
can mortgage, lease, or convey it for the term of their joint lives. 6
But he may not thereby impair the rights of the surviving spouse.T
The first question presented by the instant case is whether or not
the deed from the husband to the wife created an estoppel against the
husband, and therefore against those claiming under him. Although
he could not alone effectively convey the entire estate to a third person, yet it has been held that where the husband conveyed by warranty deed without the joinder of his wife and survived her, the
grantee acquired title by way of estoppel. 8 It is well settled that the
intention of the grantor to convey and the intention of the grantee
to accept a particular estate may form the basis of an estoppel.9 In
the instant case the Court held that the deed conveyed the husband's
usufruct in the estate and that the warranty estopped him, and therefore his heirs, as to the fee. This position seems well substantiated.' 0
The second question raised in this case is whether the deed from
the wife to her husband and herself was void. It is required by
'Phillips v. Hodges, 109 N. C. 248, 13 S. E. 769 (1891).
'Bruce v. Nicholson, 109 N. C. 202, 13 S. E. 790 (1891); Gray v. Bailey,

117 N. C. 439, 23 S. E. 318 (1895) ; Bank v. McEwen, 160 N. C. 414, 76 S. E.
222 (1912).
" Greenville v. Gornto, 161 N. C. 341, 77 S. E. 222 (1913) ; Dorsey v. Kirk-

land, 177 N. C. 520, 99 S. E. 407 (1919) ; Moore v. Trust Co., 178 N. C. 118,
100 S. E. 269 (1919).
' Bynum v. Wicker, 141 N. C. 95, 53 S. E. 478 (1906) ; Bruce v. Nicholson,
supra note 5.

'Hood v. Mercer, 150 N. C. 699, 64 S. E. 897 (1909); Davis v. Bass, 188
N. C. 200, 124 S. E. 566 (1924).
' Crawley v. Stearns, 194 N. C. 15, 138 S. E. 403 (1927) ; Bynum v. Wicker,
supra note 7; West v. Murphy, 197 N. C. 488, 149 S. E. 731 (1929).
" Eastern Bank and Trust Co. v. Broughton, 193 N. C. 320, 136 S. E. 876
(1927) ; Crawley v. Stearns, supra note 9; Dorsey v. Kirkland, supra note 6;
Moore v. Trust Co., supra note 6; see Enyeart v. Kepler, 118 Ind. 34, 20 N. E.
539 (1889) and Cullinan v. Clark, 46 Misc. 188, 93 N. Y. Supp. 256 (1904)

(that husband can convey estate to wife).
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statute that the probate officer certify, at the time of the execution of
the contract and the wife's private examination, that the contract is
not unreasonable and injurious to her.11 This condition precedent
to the validity of the deed was not fulfilled. Accordingly, the attempted conveyance was void and could not operate as an estoppel
against defendants. 12 It has been held that such a deed will constitute
color of title,13 but apparently the husband in the principal case did
not live to hold adversely for seven years after its execution.
At one time in this jurisdiction it was considered that a deed of
the husband alone was absolutely void, 14 but this position has been
relaxed to the extent that his deed will estop him. 15 This relaxation
may be attributed to the fact that the husband's deed is not entirely
invalid because it does convey the usufruct of the estate during the
joint lives of the spouses. But, the wife in the instant case was not
estopped by her deed 'because it did not fulfill the statutory requirements under which she could make a valid conveyance. There seemed
to be a justifiable policy involved in balancing a possible estoppel as
to the wife against the statutory and constitutional provisions in regard to married women's conveyances. The conclusion reached by
the Court emphasizes the importance of giving full effect to these
restrictions upon a married woman's right to convey realty, for otherwise, the estoppel would serve to accomplish indirectly that which
she may not do directly, i. e., avoid strict compliance with the statutes.
C. E. REITZEL, JR.
Judgments-Vacation for Fraud-Perjury
An action was brought to set aside and declare invalid a judgment
recovered against the plaintiff for debauching and alienating the
affections of the defendant's wife. The court concluded that the
action was based essentially upon "false testimony," and held that
sufficient extrinsic fraud to support the cause of action was not involved; that where the fraud is intrinsic, pointing to false swearing,
it must appear that the witness has been convicted of perjury.1
"N. C. ANr. CoDr (Michie, 1927) §2515, supra note 2.

Smith v. Ingram, 130 N. C. 100, 40 S. E. 984 (1902) ; Wallin v. Rice, 170
N. C. 417, 87 S. E. 239 (1915) ; Scott v. Battle, 85 N. C. 184, 39 Am. Rep. 694
(1881) ; Sims v. Ray, 96 N. C. 87, 2 S. E. 443 (1887).
I Norwood v. Totten, 166 N. C.649, 82 S. E. 951 (1914) ; Whitten v. Peace,
188 N. C. 298, 124 S. E. 571 (1924); Garner v. Homer, 191 N. C. 539, 132
S. E. 290 (1926).

"Gray v. Bailey, supra note 5.
"Davis v. Bass, supra note 8.
'McCoy v. Justice, 199 N. C. 602, 155 S. E. 452 (1930).

NOTES AND COMMENTS
A court loses control of its judgments when the term in which
they are rendered comes to an end and, in North Carolina, relief
therefrom can only be had by appeal, motion, or an independent action.2 The latter replaces and is, in essence, the same as the relief
formerly granted by equity. Chancery did not act in an appellate
capacity.3 The original judgment was not questioned, but its enforcement was enjoined because of some matter that the court did
not or could not consider. Under the modern practice the judgment
is actually attacked, injunctive relief being ancillary, but the policy,
requiring that there be an end to litigation and favoring the finality
of judgments, militates against any reconsideration of matters at issue
in the original action. The plaintiff must show that it will be against
conscience to enforce the judgment ;4 that no adequate legal remedy
exists ;6 that he has a meritorious cause of action or defense which
was not taken advantage of in the original action because of some
circumstance not attributable to his own neglect-that, in the event of
a new trial, the result will in all probability be7 different ;8 and that he
has not been guilty of laches in seeking relief.
Fraud is one of the most common grounds for equitable interference and in North Carolina can only be taken advantage of by an
independent action.8 But as a result of the policy which frowns
upon two litigations of the same matter, it must be extrinsic or col' In North Carolina fraud is the only important ground for equitable relief
which exists today, for practical purposes. The others come within the purview
of §600 of N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1927) permitting a judgment obtained by
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect to be set aside within a
year after notice thereof upon the motion of the aggrieved party. An irregular
judgment, one rendered contrary to the practice of the court, may be set aside
upon a motion made within a reasonable time. See MCINTosH, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1929) §§649-656.
'Fentress v. Robbins, 4 N. C. 610 (1817) ; Peace v. Nailing, 16 N. C. 289
(1829).
' Pickford v. Talbott, 225 U. S. 651, 32 Sup. Ct. 687, 56 L. ed. 1240 (1912);
Marine Ins. Co. v. Hodgson, 7 Cranch 332, 3 L. ed. 362 (1813) ; Hansen v.
Mann, 5 N. C. 410 (1810); Jones v. Jones, 4 N. C. 547 (1817).
5
Embry v. Palmer, 107 U. S. 10, 2 Sup. Ct. 31, 27 L. ed. 349 (1882) ; Mottu
v. Davis, 153 N. C. 160, 39 S. E. 63 (1910).
' N. C. Mut. and Prov. Ass'n v. Edwards, 168 N. C. 378, 84 S. E. 139 (1915);
Bissel v. Bozman, 17 N. C. 154 (1831) ; Koop v. Acken, 90 Neb. 77, 132 N. W.
721 (1911); Cantwell v. Thatcher Bros. Banking Co., 47 Utah 150, 151 Pac.
986 (1915).
' Dyche v. Patton, 56 N. C. 332 (1857); Perry v. Rue, 31 La. Ann. 287
(1879); Gray v. Barton, 62 Mich. 186, 28 N. W. 813 (1886); Schulteis v.
Trade Press Pub. Co., 191 Wis. 164, 210 N. W. 419 (1926).
'Stocks v. Stocks, 179 N. C. 285, 102 S. E. 306 (1920); Jernigan v. Jernigan,
178 N. C. 84, 100 S. E. 184 (1919); Simmons v. Box Co., 148 N. C. 344, 6Z
S. E. 435 (1908) ; Carter v. Rountree, 109 N. C. 29, 13 S. E. 716 (1891).
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lateral and not intrinsic.9 Thus the fraud must be instrumental in
preventing a party from presenting his cause of action or defense.
If it relates to the merits of the case, it is not sufficient. 10 "It must
be borne in mind that it is not fraud in the cause of action, but fraud
in its management, which entitles a party to relief."' 1
Perjury is, without a doubt, fraud. However, since it seldom
exists apart from the merits of the case, it is intrinsic and is not a
sufficient ground for setting aside a judgment. 12 This is the broad
rule as laid down in most jurisdictions, but in many of the cases
relief would have been refused for some other reason-negligence,
laches. It is said that a litigant must expect false testimony, especially where a false claim is made, and that if he fails to controvert
it in the original action, he cannot have a second chance. 13 But, it
seems that the policy against relitigation would be amply safeguarded
by requiring him to exercise a high degree of care in refuting such
testimony and that to arbitrarily deny relief is unnecessary. A few
cases attempt to distinguish between perjury as to matters directly
in issue and perjury relating to the "history of the case," i. e., where
there is a concocted cause of action. 14 In some cases, relief is
granted where the court has been imposed upon. 15 In all cases where
perjury is recognized as a ground for setting aside a judgment, it
'Mottu v. Davis, supra note 5; McCoy v. Justice, supra note 1; U. S. v.
Throckmorton, 98 U. S. 61, 25 L. ed. 93 (1878); Nelson v. Meehan, 155 Fed.
1 (C. C. A. 9th, 1907); McKechney v. Chicago, 194 Ill. App. 539 (1915);
Michael v. Am. Nat. Bank, 84 Ohio St. 374, 95 N. E. 905 (1911).
"' Cantwell v. Thatcher Bros. Banking Co., .rpra note 8; Williamson v.
Jerome, 169 N. C. 215, 85 S. E. 300 (1915).

13 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) §1233.
'U. S. v. Throckmorton, supra note 9; Colburn v. Denison, 149 Wash. 591,

271 Pac. 885 (1928) ; Graves v. Graves, 132 Iowa 199, 109 N. W. 707, 10 L.

R. A. (N. S.) 216 (1906) ; Pico v. Cohn, 91 Cal. 129, 25 Pac. 970, 25 Am. St.

Rep. 159 (1891); Friese v. Hummel, 26 Ore. 145, 37 Pac. 458 (1894); Note
(1926) 21 ILL. L. Ray. 833; Note (1927) 12 CORN. L. Q. 385.
"4 Pico v. Cohn, supra note 12.
" Bolden v. Sloss-Sheffield Steel & Iron Co., 215 Ala. 334, 110 So. 574

(1925) (It was learned that a "wife" who had recovered damages for the death
of her "husband" was not a wife. Relief was granted to "protect the court.") ;
Chicago R. I. & P. R. Co. v. Callicotte, 267 Fed. 799 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920)

(Recovery in action for personal injuries by the use of drugs causing temporary
paralysis. Held extrinsic fraud.) ; El Reno Fire Ins. Co. v. Sutton, 41 Okla.
297, 137 Pac. 700 (1913)

(Recovery for loss of goods by fire which had been

previously removed from the country. Held extrinsic fraud.) The basis of the
distinction seems to lie in the fact that the injured party was kept from defending the case by the other party's false testimony. Nevertheless, the fraud
is intrinsic in that it concerns the merits of the case.
"Ex Patte Cade, 220 Ala. 666, 127 So. 154 (1930) ; Johnson v. Building &
Loan Ass'n., 133 Ill. App. 213 (1907) ; Electric Plaster Co. v. Blue Rapids
City Township, 81 Kan. 730, 106 Pac. 1079 (1910); Pugh v. Ahrms, 179 Ark.

829, 19 S. W. (2d) 1030 (1929).

NOTES AND COMMENTS

must have been a material, if not controlling, factor in the original
action.16 The proof thereof must be clear and convincing and not
merely impeaching evidence. 17 A conviction is necessary in North
Carolina' s and it is not sufficient if procured upon the sole testimony
of the complaining party. 19 Sometimes it is required that the successful litigant be the author of the false testimony or a party
thereto. 20
It is submitted that a rule permitting a judgment to be set aside
where its enforcement would be against conscience, as in Wisconsin,
is much more in keeping with equitable principles than the generally
prevailing one.2 1 Especially is this true of perjury which, although
usually involved in the merits of the case, may be just as effective in
preventing a party from obtaining the benefit22of a meritorious cause
of action or defense as some extrinsic fraud.
T. C. SMITH, Ja.
:Mortgages-Registration-Priority
Two recent North Carolina cases involve fundamentally the recordation statutes. In Story v. Slade,' two mortgages were placed
on the land and the second instrument had "second mortgage" written after the description. The first instrument was filed for registration but before it had been indexed and cross-indexed the second
instrument was fully recorded. The court found the second instrument to have priority since the reference to the unindexed mortgage
1
Koop v. Acken, supra note 6; Sargeant Co. v. Baublis, 127 Il1. App. 631
(1906) ; Peagram v. King, 9 N. C. 605 (1823) ; Mottu v. Davis, supra note 5;
Kinsland v. Adams, 172 N. C. 765, 90 S. E. 899 (1916).

" Boring v. Ott, 138 Wis. 260, 119 N. W. 865 (1909) ; Myers v. Smith, 59

Neb. 30, 80 N. W. 273 (1899) ; Robertson v. Freebury, 87 Wash. 558, 152 Pac.
5 (1915) (admission not enough); McBride v. Cowen, 90 Okla. 130, 216 Pac.
104 (1923) (parol testimony alone insufficient) ; Cleveland Iron Mining Co. v.
Husby, 72 Mich. 61, 40 N. W. 168 (1888) (written documents or conviction

of perjury necessary).
'McCoy v. justice, supra note 1; Kinsland v. Adams, supra note 16;
Mottu v. Davis, mtpra note 9; Dyche v. Patton, supra note 7; Moore v. Gulley,
.upra note 8; Dyche v. Patton, supra note 7 (conviction not necessary if witness dead or otherwise unobtainable for prosecution) ; Burgess v. Lovengood,
55 N. C. 457 (1856) ; Peagram v. King, Jupra note 16.
Home v. Home, 75 N. C. 101 (1876).

"Julien v. West, 96 Cal. App. 356, 274 Pac. 421 (1929) ; Camp v. Ward,

60 Vt. 286, 14 At]. 461 (1897) ; Stanley v. Spann, 21 S. W. (2d) 305 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1929) (false testimony must be willful).
'3
FREEMAN, 10c. cit. supra note 11; Laun v. Kipp, 155 Wis. 260, 145 N. W.
183 (1914) ; Boring v. Ott, supra note 17.
=Boring v. Ott, supra note 17; Note (1891) 25 Am. St. Rep. 165; 12 CORN.
L. Q. 285.
'199 N. C. 596, 155 S. E. 256 (1930).
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was insufficient to make the former subject to the latter. In Lawson
v. Key, 2 the question was one of priority between a second and third
deed of trust when the third deed of trust bore on its face: "This
being the same lands conveyed this year to the Greensboro Joint
Stock Land Bank in a deed of trust for $1,392 and a second deed of
trust to R. F. Hemmings for $1,400." The warranty clause therein
recited that the premises were free and clear from any and all incumbrances, "except as above stated." In fact, the second deed of trust
was for $4,167.60. The court held the third instrument to have
priority since it was registered first and the language used was insufficient to indicate an intention to make the third instrument subordinate to the second one.
The majority of jurisdictions3 permit notice aliunde to take the
place of registration, since the purpose of the statute is merely to give
notice of conveyances and encumbrances and is not designed to give
persons, who have had notice otherwise and who have neither suffered injury nor been misled, an undue advantage. 4 Thus it is argued
that, when the parties know of the equitable rights of others in the
property, to permit them to obtain priority by recording first would
enable them to take advantage of the registry laws and would lead
perhaps to fraud. At the same time it would penalize rather heavily
a failure to pursue the technical course laid down by the statute. 5
The minority 6 (which includes North Carolina) has taken the
view that the statute has a double purpose, first, to give notice of conveyances and encumbrances; second, to exclude the necessity of parol
proof upon the question whether or not another person has had notice
2199 N. C. 664, 155 S. E. 570 (1930).
Civ. CODE (1923) §6887; (1927)

2 AL.A. L. J. 36; CAL. Civ. CODE
(Deering, 1927) §1217; Slaker v. McCormick-Saeltzer Co., 179 Cal. 387, 177
Pac. 155 (1918) ; IL. STAT. ANN. (Callaghan's, 1924) c. 30, 131, §30; Interstate Bld'g and Loan Ass'n of Bloomington v. Ayers, 177 Ill. 9, 52 N. E.34Z
' ALA.

(1898); MicH. Coup. LAWS (Cahill, 1915) §11721; Mo. Rav. STAT. (1919)
§2200. But cf. §2256 (chattel mortgages); (1926) 11 ST. Louis L. REv. 42;
S. C. CODE OF LAWS (1922) c. LXVII (5312) §1; TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. (1925)
art. 6627; VA. CODE ANN. (1919) §5194; (1927) 5 CAN. BAR REV. 696; 1 JONES
ON MORTGAGES (8th ed. 1928) §670.

' Hart v. Farmers' and Mechanics' Bank, 33 Vt. 252 (1860) ; Westerly Savings Bank v. Stillman Manufac. Co., 16 R. I. 497, 17 Atl. 918 (1889).
'Russell-Colenan Oil Mill v. Johnson, 287 S.W. 134 (Tex. Civ. App.
1926).
'Ridings v. Johnson, 128 U. S.212, 9 Sup. Ct. 72, 32 L. ed. 401 (1888);
ARK. DiG. STAT. (Crawford & Moses, 1921) §7381; Reidmiller v. Comes, 158
Ark. 21, 249 S.W. 354 (1923); PA. STAT. (Supp. 1928) §8845a; (1927) 16
L. T. 62; 1 JoNES

ON MORTGAGES

(8th ed. 1928) §671.

NOTES AND COMMENTS
of prior equities. 7 This view furnishes a clear and certain standard
of decision, incapable of variation and easy of application, and thereby
eliminates a very fruitful source of litigation with reference to land
titles and priority of liens.8 Therefore North Carolina has held that
no notice, however full and formal, will supply the place of registration. 9
There is, however, in North Carolina a deviation from this view,
based upon an implied trust created by the intention of the parties as
shown in the second instrument.' 0 Thus, if the prior unregistered
instrument is referred to with sufficient certainty" in the subsequent
paper, the court will construe a trust in favor of the former, and the
lack of recordation can have no effect. This construction is the
median line and seems to derive the best principles from the two extremes stated above and gives an elasticity which is in keeping with
equitable principles and consonant with policy. Therefore where the
second recorded instrument on its face clearly gives notice, the necessity of parol evidence does not arise and the North Carolina policy is
fully complied with.
Story v. Slade was decided in keeping with the strict North Carolina rule and rightly so, since parol evidence would have been necessary to construe the notice derived from the face of the second
mortgage.
It is submitted that Lawson v.Key might well have been classed
in the implied trust group to the extent, at least, of the amount
($1,400) mentioned on the face of the third deed of trust. This
would not have been too great an extension of that rule as the court
has held,' 2 "the words, 'that the same are free from all incumbrances
'Fleming v. Burgin, 37 N. C. 584 (1843).
'Blevins v. Barker, 75 N. C. 436 (1876) ; Building Association v. Clark, 43

Ohio 427, 2 N. E. 846 (1885).
'Robinson v. Willoughby, 70 N. C. 358 (1874); North State Piano Co. v.
Spruill & Bro., 150 N. C. 168, 63 S.E. 723 (1909) ; Story v. Slade, supra note
1; Lawson v. Key, supra note 2.
1 Hinton v. Leigh, 102 N. C. 28, 8 S. E. 890 (1889) ; Commercial & Farmers' Bank v. Vass, 130 N. C. 590, 41 S.E. 791 (1902) ; Avery County Bank v.
Smith, 186 N. C. 635, 120 S. E. 215 (1923). But cf. Savings Bank & Trust Co.
v. Brock, 196 N. C. 24, 144 S. E. 365 (1928) ; (1928) 7 N. C. L. REV. 95.
'In Hardy v. Fryer, 194 N. C. 420, 139 S.E. 833 (1924), the requisites of
sufficiency were set forth as follows: (1) The creditor holding the prior unregistered incumbrance must be named and identified with certainty. (2) The
property must be conveyed "subject to" or in subordination to, such prior incumbrance. (3) The amount of such prior incumbrance must be definitely
stated. (4) The reference to the prior unregistered incumbrance must amount
to a ratification and adoption thereof.
"Commercial & Farmers' Bank v. Vass, supra note 10.
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whatever except as above stated,' clearly demonstrate that the land
was conveyed by the mortgage in subordination to a charge in favor
of the vendor." It is true that the words "subject to"' 8 are missing,
but it is submitted that there is no peculiar necromancy in those particular words and that it is the intention of the parties which is sought
after and not a distinction depending upon a technical use of words.
The liberal view might well be taken in finding implied trusts, especially when it does not conflict with the policy of the recordation
statutes.
HUGH BROWN CAMPBELL.

Sunday Laws-Amusements as Violation-Admission Charges
Under Guise of Voluntary Contributions for Charity
Albany Theatre exhibited moving pictures on Sunday, proceeds
going to the American Legion fund for neglected children, after
expenses of operating the show were deducted. Held, violation of
the Georgia Sunday law (making it a misdemeanor for any person to
pursue his busiiess, or the work of his ordinary calling, on the Lore"
Day, works of necessity or charity only excepted'), whether admis2
sion was charged or contributions were voluntary.
Though the statutory designations of Sunday as a day of rest and
prohibition of the doing of specified acts on that day are, in effect, a
modified restatement of the Fourth Commandment, which directs
abstention from labor on the Sabbath, they are essentially civil,
rather than religious, regulations. 3 Their constitutionality is upheld,
as being a legitimate exercise of the police power.4 The regulation
of Sunday activities is not only within the powers of the states, but
" Avery County Bank v. Smith, supra note 10.
PENAL CoDE, §416 (Michie, 1926).
'GA.
'Albany Theater, Inc., et al. v. Short, Solicitor General, et al., 154 S. E. 895
(Ga. 1930).

'Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299, 16 Sup. Ct. 1086, 41 L. ed. 166
(1896); Swann v. Swann, 21 Fed. 299 (C. C. E. D. Ark. 1884); Ex parte
Koser, 60 Cal. 177 (1882) ; Richmond v. Moore, 107 II. 429, 47 Am. Rep. 445
(1883) ; Rodman v. Robinson, 134 N. C. 503, 47 S. E. 19, 101 Am. St. Rep. 877,

65 L. R. A. 682 (1904); State v. Powell, 58 Ohio St. 324, 50 N. E. 900, 41
L. R. A. 854 (1898) ; Specht v. Commonwealth, 8 Pa. St. 312, 48 Am. Dec. 518

(1848) ; Note (1894) 22 L. R. A. 721.
' Petit v. State of Minnesota, 177 U. S. 164, 20 Sup. Ct. 666, 44 L. ed. 716

(1900) ; Brunswick-Balke-Collander Co. v. Evans et al., 228 Fed. 991 (D. C.,

Ore. 1916).

NOTES AND COMMENTS
may also be granted to a local government, generally a municipality. 5
In the absence of a statute participation in innocent amusements on
Sunday is lawful. 6
There are three types of statutory provisions under which Sunday
amusements are attacked. The first type prohibits the performance
of work and labor in one's ordinary calling on the Sabbath. Though
the cases are in slight conflict the prevailing view is that conducting
moving picture shows involves labor within the prohibition of the
Sunday laws, 7 but it is not "servile labor" within the meaning of a
Sunday statute prohibiting such labor ;8 and it is not a work of necessity.9 It has been held that the operation of a moving picture show
on Sunday near an army camp is within a statute forbidding the
performance of labor or services other than daily necessities or
charity. 10 Professional baseball players engaged in an exhibition
game on Sunday, for which they received no additional compensation,
and to which no admittance fee was charged, were held to be "laboring" within the meaning of a statute making it a misdemeanor for any
person, on Sunday, to labor at any trade or calling." With slight
Nariations statutes prohibiting "worldly employment, labor, or busiaPower v. Nordstrom et al., 150 Minn. 228, 184 N. W. 967, 18 A. L. R. 733
(1921) ; Ex parte Johnson, 20 Okla. Crim. 66, 201 Pac. 533 (1921).
'Legislation on Sunday observance originated in Rome in 321 A.D., when
Constantine the Great required all Judges and inhabitants of cities to rest on
the venerable day of the Sun. Under Theodosius II, 425 A.D., games and
theatrical exhibitions were prohibited on Sunday, and about a century later all
labor was prohibited on that day. In England laws of a similar character
were in force in the reign of Athelstan, 925 to 940 A. D. 25 R. C. L. 1413, 1414;
37 Cyc. 540.
The Common Law did not prohibit the doing on Sunday of any act which
otherwise was lawful, Dury v,Defontaine, 1 Taunt. 131, 127 Eng. Rep. 781
(1808) (allowing the sale of goods on Sunday) ; Note Am. Cas. 1918B, 387;
25 R. C. L. 1413, 1414; see Eden v. People, 161 Ill.
296, 43 N. E. 1108, 52 Am.
St. Rep. 365, 366 (1896); City of Marengo v. Rowland, 263 Ill.
531, 105 N. E.
285, 286, Am. Cas. 1915C, 198, 199 (1914).
The evolution of the English Law on Sunday observance may be noticed
in a series of Sunday Observance Acts. 1 Car. 1, c. 1 (1625) (prohibiting
extra-parochial sports) ; 3 Car. 1, c. 2 (1627) (trade of carriers or butchers) ;
29 Car. 2, c. 7 (1677) (trade generally); 21 Geo. 3, c. 49 (1871) (public
entertainments).
'Note (1919) 4 A. L. R. 382, 385.
'Binkley v. State, 19 Okla. Crim. 199, 198 Pac. 884 (1921).
'Rosenbaum v. State, 131 Ark. 251, 191 S.W. 388, L. R. A. 1918B, 1109
(1917) ; State v. Ryan, 180 Conn. 582, 69 Atl. 536 (1908) ; Capital Theater Co.
v. Commonwealth, 178 Ky. 780, 199 S.W. 1076 (1918).
"Rosenbaum v. State, supra note 9.
' Crook et al. v. Commonwealth, 147 Va. 593, 136 S.E. 565 (1927).
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ness" have been applied to football, 12 baseball, 13 and moving pic14
tures.
The second type of statute relates to the nature of the amusement.
While the cases are divided the better view is that moving picture
shows come within the meaning of the words "and such other amusements" following a statutory definition of public amusements as
circuses, theatres, etc., 15 yet baseball has been held not within the
designation "game of any kind"' 6 or "sports."'17 Moving pictures
come within the meaning of various other statutory definitions of
amusements.18

The third type of statute deals with the sale of tickets to the
amusement. The sale of theatre tickets has been held to come within
a statute prohibiting the sale of "goods, wares, or merchandise" on
Sunday. 19 The contrary result was reached under a statute prohibiting the sale of "any Commodity."2
In spite of the fact that the statutes are criminal or penal in nature
the courts seem to have no hesitancy in saying that they are applicable
to changed conditions. The fact that the prohibitive act was passed
before the invention of moving pictures was held to be immaterial, if
they come within the classification defined. 2 ' A contrary holding was
' Walsh et al. v. State, 33 Del. 514, 139 Atl. 257, 56 A. L. R. 810 (1927).
"Levering et al. v. Williams et al., 134 Md. 48, 106 Atl. 176, 4 A. L. R. 374
(1919); Commonwealth ex rel. Woodruff v. American Baseball Club of Philadelphia, 290 Pa. 136, 138 AtI. 497, 53 A. L. R. 1027 (1927); Crook et al. v.
Commonwealth, supra note 11. But it has been held that the managing, promoting, and playing of a public game of baseball to which an admission is
charged is not engaging in any labor within the prohibition of a Sunday law.
Territory v. Davenport, 17 N. M. 214, 124 Pac. 795, 41 L. R. A. (N. S.) 407
(1912).
,State v. Ryan, supra note 9; State v. Kelly, 129 Kan. 849, 284 Pac. 363
(1930); State v. Blair, 130 Kan. 863, 288 Pac. 729 (1930); Capital Theater
Co. v. Commonwealth, supra note 9; Dillard v. State, 104 Neb. 209, 175 N. W.
668 (1920) ; State v. Rosenberg, et al. 115 Atl. 203 (N. J. 1915).
Ex parte Lingenfelter, 64 Tex. Crim. 30, 142 S.W. 555, ANN. CAs. 1914C,
765 (1911); Zucarro v. State, 82 Tex. Crim. 1, 197 S.W. 982, L. R. A. 1918B,
580, 101 N. E. 192
354 (1917); compare City of Clinton v. Wilson, 257 Ill.
(1913).
"'State v. Prather, 79 Kan. 513, 100 Pac. 57, 131 Am. St. Rep. 339, 21

L. R. A. (N. S.) 23 (1909).

Territory v. Davenport, supra note 13.
Crawford v. City of Pascagoula, 123 Miss. 131, 85 So. 181 (1920) (statute
prohibited showing of "plays of any kind") ; People ex rel. Bender v. Joyce
et al., 174 App. Div. 574, 35 N. Y. Crim. 309, 161 N. Y. Supp. 771 (1916)
(same, ". . . or shows") ; Richards v. State, 110 Ohio St. 311, 143 N. E. 714
(1924) (same, "theatrical performance").
State v. Blair, supra note 14.
Binkley v. State, supra note 8.
2 Zucarro v. State, mspra note 15; Richards v. State, supra note 18 (but
moving pictures had come into existence at the time of the last amendment).
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had in the case of baseball.2 2 In an extremely liberal construction
the Pennsylvania Court held its censorship statute to include the
23
spoken words of moving picture entertainments.
The charging, or omission to charge, an admission fee has been
24
the determinative factor in the question of the violation of statutes.
Sunday baseball 25 and moving picture shows 26 have been expressly
prohibited where an admission fee is charged. They have similarly
been held to come within the prohibitive statute whether an admission
fee was charged or not.2 7 The fact that the patrons were admitted
for what they chose to put in a conveniently located receptable was
held to be but a subterfuge and does not take the case out of the
28
statute.
It seems that the charity aspect, as presented in the instant case,
has been present in but one other case, which went even further than
the Georgia Court to declare it within the statute. A concert, for
which admission was charged, was given immediately preceding a
baseball game; between the two events the gates were opened to the
public, free of all charge; the net proceeds went to a charitable organization, and the court held the baseball game to be within the
29
The destatute forbidding public sports or shows on Sunday.
mands on organized charitable institutions which are created by the
present economic depression might well have been a justification for
an opposite result in the instant case.
MILLs ScoTT BENTON.

Trade Regulation-Contracts in Restraint of TradeEmployee's Covenant Not to CompeteIn a contract for services as manager of a clothing business the
employee covenanted not to compete within a fifteen mile radius of
the store for two years after the termination of the employment.
Within the two year period the employee became connected with a
" State v. Nashville Baseball Ass'n., 141 Tenn. 456, 211 S. W. 357, 4 A. L.

R.368 (1919).
'In re Fox Film Corp., 145 At. 514 (Pa. 1929), commented on in (1929)
7 N. C. L. Rlv. 487.
" Note (1909) 21 L. R. A. (N. S.) 23; Note L. R. A. 1916B, 1130.
'State v. Hogreiver, 152 Ind. 652, 53 N. E. 921, 45 L. R. A. 504 (1899);
Note L. R. A. 1916B, 1130.
Consolidated Enterprisers, Inc., et al. v. State, 150 Tenn. 148, 263 S. W.
74 (1924).
' City of Ames v. Gerbracht, 194 Ia. 267, 189 N. W. 729 (1922).
' Saveg v. State, 25 S. W. (2d) 865 (Tex. 1930).

'People v. Ebbets et al., 36 N. Y. Crim. 117, 172 N. Y. Supp. 599 (1917)
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rival of his former employer located in an adjoining building. Held,
order restraining the employee from further breaching the covenant
affirmed.'
Agreements not to compete 2 incorporated in contracts for the sale
of a business 3 or for a term of employment 4 are commonly upheld,
obviously on the theory that the social interest in selling property or
services advantageously outweighs the same interest in free competition. Vinje, J. in Eureka Laundry Co. v. Long 5 argues that the
validity of restrictive covenants in the sales and employment contracts should be determined by the same test. But the pronouncement
that the courts look with less favor on agreements restraining employees6 seems to indicate a feeling that there is an underlying
difference between the covenants in the two kinds of contracts.
A difference in the equality of the bargaining parties is apparent,
if the sales contract is thought of as an agreement between merchant
chiefs and the employment contract as an agreement between a captain of industry and an independent wage earner, but this difference
becomes less marked, if the sales contract is pictured as a transaction
between a national store organization and a small local merchant and
the employment contract as between organized labor and the employer.
However, a fundamental difference is found in the nature of the
basic transactions. The vendor bargains away his right to compete
as an essential element in the sale of his good will, and his good will
is an item of property intimately connected with the business sold.
The employee sells his services, and the good will involved in the
restrictive covenant is that of the employer, which he seeks to protect
thereby after the services are over, so that the period of non-competition, which gives meaning to the sale of good will, has no connection
1
Moskin Bros. v. Schwartzberg, 199 N. C. 539, 155 S. E. 154 (1930). (An
additional provision of the covenant, that the employee would not compete

within a fifteen mile radius of any other store owned by the employer, was

not called in question, but on the authority of Samuel Stores v. Abrams, 94
Conn. 248, 108 Atl. 541 (1919), 9 A. L. R. 1450 (1920), it was unenforceable.)
'WILLISTON, CONTRACTS (1920) §§1633-1664; Carpenter, Validity of Contracts not to Compete (1928) 76 U. OF PA. L. REv. 244.

'Morehead Sea Food Co., Inc., v. Way, 169 N. C.679, 86 S. E. 603 (1915)
(sale of fish business in M. and covenant not to compete for 10 years within
100 miles of M.); Note (1929) 8 N. C. L. REv. 90.
'Recent cases cited in note 9, infra.
'146 Wis. 205, 131 N. W. 412 (1911).
'A. Fink & Sons, Inc., v. Goldberg, 101 N. J. Eq. 644, 139 Atl. 408 (1927)
(injunction granted to enforce covenant by salesman of meat products not to
solicit orders for any competitor of his employer within certain counties for
one year after the termination of the employment).
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with the sale of services as such. 7 The contract of sale contemplates
the period of non-competition as a thing bought; the contract of
employment contemplates the period of non-competition as a shield
against attacks on the employer's good will by the employee, and as
the employer cannot acquire this shield by an agreement not to compete per se,8 if he is entitled to acquire it as an incident of the contract, it must be on the ground that the employment changes the
situation between the contracting parties. It is apparent that a window washer, for example, is no better able to compete against a bank
that hires him after than before the employment, and that a restrictive
covenant (if conceivable) should not be enforced in such a situation.
But in two types of cases the employment does change the situation between the parties, i. e., where in the course of the employment
the employee (1) comes into personal contact with the employer's
customers or clients, 9 and (2) acquires personal knowledge of trade
or business secrets.' 0 In the first case the employee represents the
'For example, if a druggist sells his good will and opens another store the
next day, his good will follows him and the vendee has failed to get what he
has bought, but, if a window washer sells his services to A for one day and
works for B the next, the work done for A is none the less valuable.
"Samuel Stores v. Abrams, supra note 1.
'Restrictive covenants in the following cases were enforced: Alexson v.
Columbine Laundry Co., 81 Colo. 254, 254 Pac. 990 (1927) (driver of laundry
wagon) ; International Fire Ins. Co. v. Carrington, 241 Ill. App. 208 (1926)
(fire insurance salesman) ; Eigelback v. Boone Loan and Ins. Co., 216 Ky. 69,
287 S. W. 225 (1926) (manager of a loan company); Mason v. Thos. W.
Briggs & Co., 221 Ky. 127, 297 S. W. 1106 (1927) (newspaper man); Edgecomb v. Edmonston, 257 Mass. 12, 153 N. E. 99 (1926) (shorthand writer engaged in law reporting) ; Walker Coal and Ice Co. v. Westerman, 263 Mass.
235, 160 N. E. 801 (1928) (driver of ice wagon); Athletic Tea Co. v.
Cole., 16 S. W. (2d) 735 (Mo. App. 1929) (house to house salesman of coffee and tea); A. Fink & Sons, Inc., v. Goldberg, supra note 6 (retail salesman of meat products on rural route); Scaldron's Sons, Inc., v. Susskind,
132 Misc. 406, 229 N. Y. Supp. 209 (1928) (optometrist) ; Southern Properties,
Inc., v. Carpenter, 299 S. W. 440 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927) (driver of ice wagon);
Putsnam v. Taylor, 1927 1 K. B. 741 (manager of tailor shop).
In Byers v. Trans-Pecos Abstract Co., 18 S. W. (2d) 1096 (Tex. Civ. App.
1929), the court refused to enforce a restrictive covenant against an abstracter,
who during the time employed by the company had acquired knowledge of their
business, clientele, books, records, and methods, distinguishing the case from
those involving ice and laundry wagon drivers on grounds of differences in the
personal relations between the respective employees and their employer's customers.
"' Restrictive covenants in the following cases were enforced: Ideal Laundry
Co. v. Gugliemone, 151 Atl. 617 (N. J. L. 1930) (floor supervisor of ironing
department acquired knowledge of improved ironing machinery) ; Davey Tree
Expert Co. v. Back, 244 N. Y. Supp. 239 (1930) (tree surgeon acquired knowledge of secret scientific facts); Eagle Pencil Co. v. Jannsen, 135 Misc. 534,
238 N. Y. Supp. 49 (1929) (draftsman engaged to draw secret mechanical

devices).
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employer and the employer's good will becomes associated in the
public mind with the representative. Here the transfer of the representative to a rival would cause the employer a loss of good will
against which nothing would protect but a period of non-competition,
it being impracticable to enforce covenants not to solicit or accept the
employer's customers. During the period of non-competition the
good will associated with the employee would be inactive and the
employer would be able to have his good will become associated with
the employee's successor with the smallest possible loss occasioned by
the transfer. In the second case the employee is placed by virtue of
his employment in a position to do the employer an injury, which no
amount of competition before the employment would have equalled.
It should be noted, however, that the knowledge acquired must be
secret in the sense that competitors do not have it, and not merely in
the sense that it would not be known to persons outside the business."1
The test of the validity of restrictive covenants in contracts for
the sale of a business as laid down by the North Carolina court is
whether the restriction is for the reasonable protection of the vendee's
business. 12 This is adequate in view of the fact that the period of
non-competition is bought, but this test on principle is not applicable
in the case of a contract of employment. There the period of noncompetition is not bought, but put into the agreement to prevent the
employer's being subjected by reason of the employment to competition which would not otherwise have been possible. The test of the
validity of an employee covenant should be whether the employer is
so subjected, and not, as is sometimes stated, whether the covenant
provides for the protection the employer's business requires.1"
The result of the instant case can be justified under the suggested
test as the employee came into personal contact with the employer's
customers. The case, however, was decided on the authority of
Scott v. Gillis,14 which upheld a restrictive covenant between public
accountants. The court pointed out no difference between employee
and vendee covenants and, after reviewing North Carolina cases involving sales contracts, applied the test there used to the one in hand.
"Byers v. Trans-Pecos Abstract Co., supra note 9 (employee had access to
all the files of the office, but this information not considered secret).
'Morehead

City Sea Food Co., Inc., v. Way, supra note 3.

Restrictive covenants in employment contracts are enforceable as in sales
contracts "'whenever it appears that the restraint sought is no greater than the
fair protection of the plaintiff's business requires." Edgecomb v. Edmonston,
supra note 9, 153 N. E. at 101.
I'197 N. C 223, 148 S. E. 315 (1929).

